In 2001, Portugal became the only EU-member state to decriminalize drugs, a distinction which continues through to the present.  Last year, working with the Cato Institute, I went to that country in order to research the effects of the decriminalization law (which applies to all substances, including cocaine and heroin) and to interview both Portuguese and EU drug policy officials and analysts (the central EU drug policy monitoring agency is, by coincidence, based in Lisbon).  Evaluating the policy strictly from an empirical perspective, decriminalization has been an unquestionable success, leading to improvements in virtually every relevant category and enabling Portugal to manage drug-related problems (and drug usage rates) far better than most Western nations that continue to treat adult drug consumption as a criminal offense.

From what I can gather, Greenwald is presenting the findings of his research on Monday at the Cato Institute (libertarian think-tank) in Washington DC.  If you are in DC and want to attend, or if you want to watch it live on-line you can register or watch it here.

The details, to say the least, should be interesting.

In fact the war on drugs has been a disaster, creating failed states in the developing world even as addiction has flourished in the rich world. By any sensible measure, this 100-year struggle has been illiberal, murderous and pointless. That is why The Economist continues to believe that the least bad policy is to legalise drugs.“Least bad” does not mean good. Legalisation, though clearly better for producer countries, would bring (different) risks to consumer countries. As we outline below, many vulnerable drug-takers would suffer. But in our view, more would gain.

The mexican drug cartels are running rampant across our neighbor to the south, outgunning and murdering the mexican authorities that they cannot bribe or intimidate.  Why?  Because they are flush with cash due to the high price of illegal drugs caused by the US prohibition.  It’s definitely not because they are trying to run Dos Equis or Kool 100s across the border.

Friends of mine recently went to Egypt and Jordan and there were more State Department warnings about Mexico than either of those middle-eastern countries.  Mexico is in a bad way, and the situation rightly calls for a re-evaluation of drug prohibition.   

In Mexico more than 800 policemen and soldiers have been killed since December 2006 (and the annual overall death toll is running at over 6,000). This week yet another leader of a troubled drug-ridden country—Guinea Bissau—was assassinated.

Indeed, far from reducing crime, prohibition has fostered gangsterism on a scale that the world has never seen before. According to the UN’s perhaps inflated estimate, the illegal drug industry is worth some $320 billion a year. In the West it makes criminals of otherwise law-abiding citizens (the current American president could easily have ended up in prison for his youthful experiments with “blow”). It also makes drugs more dangerous: addicts buy heavily adulterated cocaine and heroin; many use dirty needles to inject themselves, spreading HIV; the wretches who succumb to “crack” or “meth” are outside the law, with only their pushers to “treat” them. But it is countries in the emerging world that pay most of the price. Even a relatively developed democracy such as Mexico now finds itself in a life-or-death struggle against gangsters. American officials, including a former drug tsar, have publicly worried about having a “narco state” as their neighbor.

The rest of the editorial is well worth reading, but it doesn’t break new ground.  Aside from the bits about Mexico I’ve excerpted above, it’s pretty much the same, no-nonsense argument – prohibition isn’t working, has never worked and legalization will reduce crime and aid recovery.

They still want an income tax (idiots) but 65 percent of Bay State residents have used the ballot process to decriminalize amounts of pot under an ounce. You’ll get civil penalties and up to a $100 fine once the law goes into effect.